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ABSTRACT 
The need for submarines to execute communications at speed and depth (CSD) is a vital 
link in our nation’s and our allies’ defense network.  A promising method to do this 
without limiting the inherent stealth and advantage of submarines is to utilize Deep 
Seaweb, an underwater acoustic communication network.  The challenge is to be able to 
optimally employ such a network in a constantly changing environment.  In particular, 
our goal is to develop a network that is resilient to a given number of adversary attacks 
that can disable individual nodes.  To this end, we build and solve a defender-attacker-
defender (DAD) optimization model that provides the optimal location of repeater nodes 
that maintains as much of the function of the network as possible, even after a worst-case 
attack.  We analyze four initial basic network configurations and compare the resulting 
optimum node placements when the network is not subject to attack, when the network is 
subject to two attacks, and when the flow of each network configuration is completely 
blocked by attacks. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Communication among our forces is a fundamental requirement for national defense.  
There have been vast resources dedicated to improving, fortifying, encrypting, and 
expanding the communication resources available to the warfighters of all communities 
and military branches.  Elaborate networks of satellites and aircraft allow the ground 
troops, airborne troops, and surface sailors to maintain two-way communications with the 
chain of command.  Even the forces below the surface of the ocean have methods of 
ensuring that they have fairly recent information from the chain of command.  Even with 
the time latency involved, it is still sufficient to maintain the big picture and carry out the 
mission. 
The current method of obtaining this information involves either raising a mast 
while at periscope depth or surfaced or deploying a receiver and transmitter or transceiver 
while submerged.  These options place restrictions on the submarine that inhibit the 
submarine’s ability to carry out mission tasking.  Finding methods for submarines to 
maintain two-way communications at speed and depth (CSD) has been a high priority for 
the United States Navy to better capitalize on the strengths of this great asset.  One of the 
available options for CSD is utilizing a Deep Seaweb network for acoustic underwater 
communications.  The Deep Seaweb network has the potential to be a crucial link in the 
FORCEnet concept that is shaping the way information is shared among all the players in 
current and future military operations. 
Seaweb has been successfully employed in more than fifty sea trials.  One of the 
aspects that is still being developed is utilizing the Seaweb technology in the deep sound 
channel (DSC) to allow greater spacing between acoustic modems and allow the 
technology to be utilized in the open ocean with submarines and other underwater 
vehicles. 
We first develop a network design model that takes a given set of access points 
and gateway nodes and places a fixed number of modems to minimize the number of 
undelivered packets from the access points.  As a secondary objective, the model 
 xvi 
minimizes the total number of links used in transmissions from access points to any 
gateway node, to create an efficient network.  This basic model does not account for 
potential attacks, but because it considers both the design of the network and the 
operation of the network (through flow variables that model the route taken by messages 
from each access point), it provides a basis for a tri-level optimization model, called a 
defender-attacker-defender (DAD) model, which determines a network design that is 
resilient to the worst-case attack that could be mounted against that design.  
This thesis executes the algorithm on four different initial network configurations 
to compare the resiliency of various network topographies and analyzes three attack 
scenarios for each network configuration: no attacks, two attacks, and enough attacks to 
completely block all flow in the network.  The resulting network design with no attacks 
provides the basis for the effect of the attacks on each configuration.  Networks that have 
separation among the destination or gateway nodes with at least some of the access point 
or source nodes near the middle of the area are more resilient.  Also, when the destination 
nodes are not co-located, or at least have some geometric separation, such as opposite 
sides of grid, it requires more attacks to completely block the flow through the network. 
Our models generalize the concept of k-connectivity used in the designs of 
communication networks in that they can still provide network designs that retain some 
functionality, even if some of the sources are disconnected from the destinations.  We 
find that the designs provided by our model and algorithm make sense, but that some of 
these designs can be quite costly in terms of the number of repeaters required to provide 
the desired level of resilience.  Finally, the algorithms can take quite a while to solve 
larger versions of these problems, and there is much work to be done in making these 
algorithms (and possibly models) more efficient. 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. BACKGROUND 
Communication among our forces is a fundamental requirement for national 
defense.  Over the last several decades, it has become possible for all ground troop 
members to carry handheld radios that enable the accurate and timely flow of information 
both up and down the chain of command.  This has proven to be advantageous, making it 
possible for every land unit to maintain near instantaneous communications with 
headquarters.  The aviators have sophisticated equipment to ensure that they have timely 
information regarding target locations, rules of engagement, and situational awareness.  
Those sailors on the sea surface have sophisticated equipment to maintain two-way 
communications with the chain of command.  Elaborate networks of satellites and aircraft 
tie all these forces together. 
There is one facet of our communications network that is not as robust as the 
others: the link to submerged submarines.  Even though our forces below the surface of 
the ocean have methods of ensuring they have fairly recent information from the chain of 
command, there is still some time latency involved.  Although it is not up to the minute, it 
is generally only a few hours old and is sufficient to maintain the big picture and carry 
out the mission.  The importance of submarines is emphasized in A Cooperative Strategy 
for 21st Century Seapower and the Naval Operations Concept for 2006 and 2010.  Given 
the importance of communications, it is imperative to ensure that this vital link to our 
submarine troops is fortified, improved, and encrypted to ensure that sensitive 
information does not fall into the wrong hands and lead to our disadvantage both on and 
off the battlefield.  Communication with submarines without compromising their inherent 
stealth and ability to effectively carry out the mission remains a challenge.  Finding 
methods for a submarine to maintain real-time, two-way communications at speed and 
depth (CSD) has been a high priority for the United States Navy in recent years to better 
capitalize on the strengths of this important asset. 
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The current options for CSD involve strict speed and depth limitations because 
the submarine must extend a receiver and transmitter or a transceiver.  This can be done 
by 1) raising a mast while at periscope depth (PD) or surfaced, or 2) deploying a receiver 
and transmitter or a transceiver from the submarine while submerged.  The first option 
places the submarine at increased risk while at periscope depth and while surfaced greatly 
compromises the stealth of the submarine and their ability to carry out the mission.  The 
second option involves strict speed and depth restrictions to deploy a receiver and 
transmitter or a transceiver.  The device can then be useful for transmitting information 
only while it remains tethered to the submarine, which limits the submarine in speed and 
depth as long as the device remains connected.  An alternative means of communication 
without these constraints would empower submarines to better carry out mission tasking. 
There are several advanced methods of CSD that are in the research and 
development phase.  One such method is using lasers to establish two-way 
communication between the submarine and an airborne platform.  The disadvantage of 
this method is that either the submarine is required to be in a given area for an extended 
length of time so the message can be systematically broadcast over the specified area and 
the submarine can then send any outgoing information or it must come to PD to indicate 
its position.  The submarine could also remain at PD and receive and transmit 
information by radio frequency.  It could take advantage of the higher bandwidth 
available from the laser, which would require a shorter time at PD. 
Another CSD option is long-range acoustic communications.  There are several 
possibilities for this option.  One of them uses towed arrays, source moorings, and 
moored vertical-line-array receivers, but the towed array limits the maneuverability of the 
submarine and the low frequency limits the communications bandwidth and interferes 
with sonar contacts.  It is also possible to use long-range extremely low frequency 
acoustic transmitters.  This method is only one-way and, due to the high power required 
to transmit great distances, the transmitters must be very large with either a short battery 
life or shore based which limits the application when the submarine ranges too far from 
land.  Each of these methods imposes various restrictions on the submarine. 
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Utilizing a Deep Seaweb network for acoustic communications is another 
possibility for two-way communications with the submarine that does not have the same 
limitations as the current options.  This method could utilize the larger bandwidth of 
radio frequencies or lasers for the gateway buoys. 
B. POSSIBLE APPLICATIONS OF SEAWEB 
There are many possible applications for underwater acoustic communications. 
Schrope in Business 2.0 illustrates one of these concepts is in Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1.  Pictorial representation of the potential applications of 
underwater acoustic communications (From Schrope 2000). 
Another application is the FORCEnet concept.  Both Ackerman (2004) and 
Browne (2004) discussed the significance and the challenges facing the Navy in 
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developing this concept.  This complex endeavor has been the focus of the Navy’s 
network-centric warfare thrust for more than a decade now.  This concept, illustrated in 
Figure 2, ties together all the warfare communities allowing them to share information as 
close to real time as possible.  Utilizing this more timely information flow empowers the 
military forces of all communities and branches to work together in a manner that would 
otherwise be impossible. 
 
Figure 2.  Illustration of the FORCEnet concept 
(From Rice unpublished Seaweb presentation). 
C. PAST RESEARCH 
There has been significant research done on the multiple facets of underwater 
acoustic communications.  Biediger (2010) explored the environmental considerations for 
passive detection of maritime targets.  Kriewaldt (2006) analyzed the communications 
performance of a wide-area network application of Seaweb.  Goh (2010) analyzed 
various network protocols of the underwater local area network known as “Seastar.”  Ong 
(2008) analyzed the initialization process of spontaneously deployed versions of Seaweb.  
Zinkhon (2009) utilized a node localization algorithm to estimate the relative locations of 
all nodes in an ad hoc Seaweb placement.  Green, Rice, and Merriam (1998) explored the 
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aspects involved in the physical design of the modems used in the Seaweb networks.  
McGirr et al. (1999) highlighted some of the key aspects involved in the network design 
and analysis of the deployable autonomous distributed system (DADS). 
Grimmett (2007) analyzed the message routing criteria for underwater acoustic 
communications networks and utilized Dijkstra’s algorithm to solve for hypothetical 
network configurations.  Li et al. (2009) presented a multiple-input–multiple-output 
(MIMO) system design that applies spatial multiplexing with orthogonal-frequency-
division-multiplexing (OFDM) signals.  Nicholas (2009) explored the challenges of 
quickly and optimally designing a wireless mesh network.  Shankar (2008) explored the 
challenges of operating and jamming wireless mesh networks.  Sanchez (2010) described 
one of the processes used by Internet Service Providers (ISPs) when designing and 
maintaining internet networks.  Bohner (2003) used a distributed underwater acoustic 
networking (UAN) protocol for ad hoc deployment of stationary and mobile nodes across 
a relatively wide area.  Sözer, Stojanovic, and Proakis (2000a) discussed using an 
optimized network engineering tool (OPNET) modeler to design and test an underwater 
acoustic ad hoc network.  Proakis et al. (2003) discussed several design considerations 
for shallow water acoustic networks to maximize throughput and reliability with 
minimum power consumption. 
Belenguer et al. (2006) applied a branch and cut method to the location routing 
problem (LRP).  Barreto (2007) implemented cluster analysis to minimize the routing and 
location costs of a LRP.  Berger, Coullard, and Daskin (2007) utilized a set-partitioning-
based formulation of an uncapacitated location-routing model with distance constraints.  
Brown, Carlyle, and Wood applied defender-attacker-defender (DAD) optimization to 
terror risk management and mitigation in 2008 in appendix E of the Department of 
Homeland Security’s Bioterrorist Risk Assessment: A Call for Change.  Alderson et al. 
(2011) developed a DAD sequential game model for infrastructure systems that improves 
an infrastructure’s resilience to attacks from an intelligent adversary.  Brown et al. (2006) 
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II. PHYSICS BACKGROUND AND SUMMARY 
A. ACOUSTIC UNDERSEA NETWORKS 
 The requirement for wide-area undersea surveillance in littoral waters using a 
deployable autonomous distributed system (DADS), such as shown in Figure 3, has 
motivated the development of Seaweb (Rice and Green 2008).  The littoral surveillance 
application typically involves water depths up to 300 meters and node separations up to 5 
kilometers with data packets of about 1,000 information bits (McGirr et al. 1999). 
 
Figure 3.  A deployable autonomous distributed system (DADS) 
supported by a Seaweb network (From Rice 2000). 
There are several aspects of the water environment that constrain the performance 
of an underwater acoustic communications network: the relatively slow speed of sound 
through water, multipath propagation, ambient noise, limited spectral bandwidth, and 
ambient noise (Rice and Green 2008).  Nevertheless, Seaweb has been shown to be a 
viable option for CSD. 
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B. SEAWEB 
Seaweb has evolved into an underwater acoustic network that can be used for 
communications, maritime surveillance, oceanographic monitoring, underwater 
positioning, and many other purposes as depicted in Figure 4.  Battery-powered nodes in 
the Seaweb network can potentially be launched from various platforms such as 
submarines, ships, aircrafts, unmanned underwater vehicles (UUVs), or unmanned aerial 
vehicles (UAVs), allowing great flexibility in deploying an appropriate combination of 
node types and concentration for any given mission and environment. 
 
Figure 4.  Overview of the basic Seaweb concept (From Grimmett 2009). 
The capability of two autonomous underwater vehicles (AUVs) to maintain two-
way communications was demonstrated in 1993 by a field study conducted in Barrington, 
New Hampshire (Chappell et al. 1994).  Seaweb built upon that result and expanded it to 
an underwater acoustic network.  Rice summarized the Seaweb basic concept of 
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operation as, “Telesonar wireless acoustic links [that] interconnect distributed undersea 
assets, potentially integrating them as a unified resource and extending ‘net-centric’ 
operations into the undersea environment” (2000).  Seaweb is the real world application 
of undersea wireless networks (Sözer, Stojanovic, and Proakis 2000b) to include fixed 
and mobile nodes, intelligent master nodes, and manned command centers.  It also 
provides a good coordinating infrastructure for Command, Control, Communications, 
Computers, and Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) for any mission 
in an ocean environment. 
1. Seaweb Components 
Seaweb has several basic components: backbone, peripherals, gateways, and 
servers.  The backbone is a set of autonomous, stationary nodes (e.g., deployable 
surveillance sensors, sea mines, relay stations, etc.).  The peripherals are the mobile 
nodes (e.g., unmanned underwater vehicles (UUVs) to include swimmers and crawlers) 
and specialized nodes (e.g., bi-static sonar projectors).  The gateways connect the various 
command centers whether submerged, afloat, airborne, or ashore.  For Seaweb, these 
gateways are telesonar nodes to link the submerged acoustic network to other airborne, 
terrestrial, and satellite networks.  The servers are co-located with the manned command 
centers and act as an interface to the submerged acoustic network as shown in Figure 5.  
The server keeps an archive of all inbound data packets while allowing client stations 
read-only access over the internet.  Only one “super” server reconfigures and controls the 
network as needed (Fletcher et al. 2003 and Rice et al. 2001). 
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Figure 5.  The function of the Seaweb server is to connect the submerged network with 
manned command centers (From Fletcher et al., 2003 and Rice et al. 2001). 
The architecture of Seaweb is hierarchical with three fundamental layers of 
interest: the physical layer, the media-access-control (MAC) layer, and the network layer.  
These communication layers provide a functionality that can support higher application-
specific layers (Rice 2000). 
Adaptive telesonar links are established asynchronously using a half-duplex 
handshaking protocol depicted in Figure 6.  The initiating node, A, transmits a request-to-
send (RTS) signal using a frequency-hopped spread spectrum (FHSS) series or a direct-
sequence spread spectrum (DSSS) pseudo-random carrier specific to the receiver node, 
B.  The initiating node could also issue a RTS when broadcasting or linking to unknown 
nodes.  Upon receiving the RTS, node B comes out of a low-power sleep mode, 
demodulates the signal, and processes the signal to estimate the channel scattering 
function and signal excess.  Node B then acknowledges the RTS by sending a FHSS or 
DSSS clear-to-send (CTS) signal to node A specifying the data-packet modulation 
parameters based on the existing channel conditions.  After this concise RTS/CTS 
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handshake, node A transmits the data packet(s) taking full advantage of the optimal bit-
rate, modulation, coding, and source level (Rice 2005). 
 
Figure 6.  The Seaweb half-duplex handshake protocol (From Rice 2005). 
An understanding of the physical layer is reached through measuring existing 
transmission channel conditions and numerical propagation models.  Combining this with 
digital signal processor (DSP) modulators and demodulators allows the exploitation of 
the unique characteristics of the underwater channel while directional transducers 
improve modem performance (Rice 2000). 
The MAC layer’s purpose is to support secure, low-power, point-to-point 
connectivity.  The handshaking protocol just described is well suited to wireless half-duplex 
networking with slowly propagating channels while providing addressing, ranging, channel 
estimation, adaptive modulation, and power control.  It is necessary for the telesonar links to 
adapt to a changing environment while allowing for bi-directional asymmetry.  
Asynchronous multiple-access to the physical channel can be provided through spread-
spectrum modulation using code-division multiple-access (CDMA), time-division multiple-
 12 
access (TDMA), or frequency-division multiple-access (FDMA) methods.  The Seaweb 
network is then configured and maintained through the master nodes to allow network 
adaptation following node failure, addition of new nodes, and incorporation of mobile nodes.  
As the telesonar links are established, range measurement, range-rate measurement, and 
clock-synchronization are obtained which allows network initialization, navigation, and 
optimization.  This process is described in Figure 7 (Rice 2000). 
 
Figure 7.  The organization process of the Seaweb network (From Rice 2000). 
An optimized network engineering tool (OPNET) is used to simulate the Seaweb 
using basic ocean acoustic propagation assumptions allowing various network arrangements 
and protocols to be explored and refined in the laboratory (Raysin et al. 1999) while 
controlled sea trials improve telesonar signaling technologies (McDonald et al. 1999). 
Seaweb then combines the results from this research with the resources of 
extended ocean experiments.  The annual Seaweb experiments have been able to verify 
system analysis and promote essential technologies to ensure that Seaweb continues to 
evolve toward higher reliability and increased functionality.  The goal of these 
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experiments is to provide a means of implementing and testing telesonar modems in 
networks using various modulations and networking algorithms.  As improvements are 
noted and implemented, the ultimate goal can be reached: an acoustic network that is 
self-configuring with links that automatically adjust to the existing environmental 
conditions by properly selecting the optimal transit parameters (Rice 2000). 
2. Seaweb Implementations 
Seaweb technology was used in the May Sublink 2000, the April ForeFRONT-2 
and June FRONT-2, both during the same year (Codiga et al. 2000).  This extended use 
allowed collection of valuable long-term performance data.  Buzzards Bay, 
Massachusetts, shown in Figure 8, was the site for the annual Seaweb experiment for the 
first three years, 1998, 1999, and 2000.  This site was chosen since it is within line-of-
sight radio contact with Datasonics and Benthos in western Cape Cod (Rice 2000). 
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Figure 8.  Buzzards Bay, Massachusetts was the test site for 
Seaweb ’98, ’99, and 2000 (From Rice 2000). 
There are several important results from Seaweb ’98.  One of the most important 
is that the network consistently provided high quality data.  Only approximately 2% of 
the data packets delivered to the command centers had uncorrected bit errors, which came 
from the intentional collisions at the master node.  There were several important network 
concepts illustrated by Seaweb ’98:  1) the ability to store and forward data packets, 2) 
transmit retries and automatic repeat request, 3) packet routing, and 4) mitigated 
minimize multi-access interference (MAI) through FDMA node cell-like grouping.  
Several application DADS concepts were also illustrated: 1) networked underwater 
sensors, 2) wide-area coverage, 3) acoustic/radio interface, 4) robustness in a shallow-
water environment, 5) robustness during shipping noise, 6) use of sleep modes for low-
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power node operation, 7) economic feasibility, and 8) remote control.  Seaweb ’98 also 
highlighted the difference between acoustic and conventional networks:  Limited power, 
low bandwidth, and long propagation times (Rice 2000). 
Seaweb ’99 continued the advancement of undersea wireless networks.  All links 
in the network used a simple telesonar handshake protocol allowing automatic packet-
collision resolution through transmitter retries or receiver repeat requests.  The multi-
access strategy used a variation of FDMA, which was an important step toward self-
configuration and precedes the use of secure CDMA spread-spectrum unique codes 
assigned to each node during initialization.  Node-to-node ranging was simplified.  One 
of the most important aspects of Seaweb ’99 was the implementation of a Seaweb server, 
run on a laptop computer, to continually monitor, display, and log network status.  The 
server also bridged the connection between a Bell Atlantic cellular digital packet data 
(CDPD) gateway node over the internet and a radio gateway link to establish a gateway-
to-gateway route through the server.  The server was able to remotely reconfigure 
network routing, which is one important step closer to self-configuration and dynamic 
network control. 
There were several implementations of Seaweb technology between Seaweb ’99 
and Seaweb 2000: the ForeFRONT-1 (Front-Resolving Observation Network with 
Telemetry) (November 1999), FRONT-1 (December 1999), ForeFRONT-2 (April 2000), 
Sublink 2000 (May 2000), and FRONT-2 (June 2000) experiments.  These greatly aided 
the firmware transition from the ATM875 modem, which was used in Seawebs ’98 and 
’99, to the ATM885, which was used in Seaweb 2000 and has a more powerful DSP and 
more memory (Rice 2000). 
Seaweb 2000 firmware used the foundation of a structured protocol to map the 
network and MAC layers onto the physical layer based on channel conditions.  It used 
seven utility packet types while OPNET simulations were used to explore expanding that 
number.  The initial handshake utilized the RTS/CTS combination, forming a basis for 
adjusting the data modulation for channel conditions.  Data packets are sent following the 
RTS/CTS interchange.  Seaweb 2000 used a hybrid CDMA/TDMA approach vice the 
FDMA to help avoid MAI.  It also implemented two parallel Seaweb networks, the one at 
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the command center is airborne and the other one in Buzzards Bay is water-borne, 
allowing troubleshooting firmware and code change testing prior to at-sea downloads.  
All modems now logged the data in an internal buffer allowing the study of individual 
nodes following sea trials.  The modem firmware used additional channel-estimation 
diagnostics (e.g., SNR, multipath spread, Doppler spread, range rate, etc.), demodulation 
statistics (e.g., bit-error rate, automatic gain control, intermediate decoding results, power 
level, etc.), and networking (e.g., data packet source, data packet sink, routing path, etc.) 
(Rice 2000). 
The data logging allows a modem to archive the data packets.  This means that a 
node could be designated as a sink node and collect all packets from the network until 
requested by a gateway, which could be a ship arriving on station.  An internal watchdog 
timer provides a means to automatically reboot a modem if required.  SignalEx, an 
applied telesonar research effort, was hosted by Seaweb 2000 with shared resources and 
empirical test control.  Several experimental network tests explored acoustic navigation 
methods for node localization, cost functions for optimized network routing, and statistics 
for network traffic analysis.  Seaweb 2000 products were implemented in FRONT-3.  
Overall, Seaweb 2000 made major contributions toward a self-configuring, wireless, 
undersea acoustic network (Rice 2000). 
C. SUBLINK 
The associated Sublink experiments incorporated a submarine as a mobile node in 
the Seaweb networks.  Sublinks ’98 and ’99 explored acoustic communications with the 
research submarine USS Dolphin (AGSS 555), telesonar test beds, gateway buoys, 
stationary autonomous bottom nodes, and the R/V Acoustic Explorer.  These experiments 
demonstrated two-way communications with a moving submarine utilizing 
developmental telesonar technology (Rice 2000). 
These experiments also measured communications figures of merit as Dolphin 
varied her distance from telesonar test beds, depth, speed, and telesonar modem settings.  
Onboard the Dolphin, a COTS underwater telephone, EDO 5400, was integrated with the 
organic WQC-2 HF transducers located on the sail, keel, and foredeck.  Seaweb acoustic 
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modem electronics were integrated within the EDO 5400 chassis. The Seaweb operator 
station was adjacent to the sonar room with a serial connection to the EDO 5400. The 
Seaweb station included a Seaweb server and a data recorder. This station allowed wireless 
communications with autonomous network nodes as illustrated in Figure 9 (Rice 2000). 
 
Figure 9.  Illustration of the telesonar link between a submerged submarine 
and an autonomous off board device (From Rice 2000). 
Sublinks ’98 and ’99 were staged on the Loma Shelf, 10 km west-southwest of Pt. 
Loma, San Diego, in 150 to 250 m water.  Both experiments used the ATM875 modem 
and all acoustic communications were within the 8 to 10.5 kHz band to ensure 
compatibility with the WQC-2.  Acoustic Explorer was the afloat command center that 
supported the telesonar test bed operations.  It was moored south of the test beds to 
monitor Dolphin’s transmissions using an over-the-side transducer coupled with a deck 
modem.  Dolphin’s sonar acted as an acoustic gateway while the Seaweb server 
interfaced with her command center.  The server interpreted the outgoing messages and 
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commands, converted them to ASCII data packets, added the necessary headers and 
routing information, and directed the transmissions to a destination node.  The server also 
interpreted, time stamped, and logged incoming messages while providing a graphic user 
interface (Rice 2000). 
Sublink 2000 tested acoustic communication among Dolphin, seafloor based 
telesonar test beds, a moored RACOM-3 (radio acoustic communications) gateway buoy, 
telesonar listening nodes, and nodes hung over the side of the moored Acoustic Explorer 
as illustrated in Figure 10 (Rice 2000). 
  
Figure 10.  Illustration of the Sublink 2000 setup (From Rice 2000). 
A shore-based radio repeater provided internet links for the gateways at the 
RACOM buoy and the Acoustic Explorer.  This experiment tested the links between all 
network node combinations and varied the signaling and channel geometries using the 
ATM885 telesonar modem (Rice 2000). 
Some of the highlights of this experiment are as follows.  Aboard Dolphin, the 
ATM885, the EDO 5400, and the WQC-2 were successfully integrated.  Telesonar 
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communications from Dolphin to the testbed were established at ranges up to 10 km but 
the same links from the telesonar testbeds to the Dolphin were not as reliable due to 
relatively lower SNR from lower source levels and higher receiver noise levels. The 
TDMA signaling schedule was executed flawlessly. SignalEx transmissions were 
performed using a variety of waveform suites.  SignalEx and ATT9 modulation suites 
were successful between two testbeds with 7 km separation and between testbeds and 
Dolphin at speeds up to 5 knots.  Emails from Dolphin were delivered to the Office of 
Naval Research, Submarine Development Squadron Five, and the family of a young 
sailor while submerged and transiting by utilizing telesonar transmissions, the RACOM 
gateway buoy, and the Seaweb server (Rice 2000). 
In June 2001, during Fleet Battle Experiment – India, a submarine navigated a 14-
node Seaweb network with two RACOM buoys on the Loma Shelf near San Diego, CA 
as illustrated in Figure 11.  During this exercise an email was sent from a submerged 
submarine to an ashore command center (Rice et al. 2001).  This particular Seaweb 
implementation was analyzed by Hartfield in 2003 in his master’s thesis. 
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Figure 11.  During Fleet Battle Experiment – India in June 2001, a 14-node Seaweb 
network undersea grid was installed on the Loma Shelf adjacent to San 
Diego.  Mobile positions near the nodes are indicated by the submarine icon 
(Rice et al. 2001). 
In February 2003, Seaweb 2003 was conducted when the Q272 Seaweb network 
was successfully deployed in an experiment conducted with Defence Research and 
Development Canada (DRDC) in the Eastern Gulf of Mexico with three Autonomous 
Underwater Vehicles (AUVs), six repeater nodes, and two gateway nodes as shown in 
Figure 12.  In this experiment, gliders were fitted with telesonar modems and utilized as 
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mobile nodes.  These gliders were manufactured with radio communication equipment, 
which made them effective mobile gateway nodes without the vulnerability of moored 
gateway buoys (Bachmeyer et al. 2004). 
 
Figure 12.  In February, the Seaweb 2003 Q272 Seaweb network in the Eastern Gulf of 
Mexico included three AUVs, six repeater nodes, and two gateway buoys 
(From Bachmeyer et al. 2004). 
In Seaweb 2004, an experiment with 40 nodes was conducted where the reliability 
of underwater communications was shown as connectivity was maintained despite two 
hurricanes and severe trawling (Kriewaldt 2006).  The initial location of the nodes is 
shown on the left and the final location is shown on the right of Figure 13. 
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Figure 13.  Seaweb 2004 with 40 nodes. Figure on the left shows the planned deployment, 
while the right hand figure shows the final position following hurricanes and 
trawling (From Rice and Green 2008). 
In May 2005, the node-to-node acoustic ranging capability of Seaweb networked 
modems as a mechanism for tracking a UUV mobile node relative to a fixed undersea 
grid was tested in the ARIES Experiment (Acoustic Radio Interactive Exploratory 
Server) in Monterey Bay shown in Figure 14.  When the UUV is submerged, tracking 
was accomplished by triangulation from the fixed nodes.  When surfaced, Seaweb 
tracking quality was compared to GPS position.  This comparison produced reliable 
results and showed the viability of the Seaweb network (Ouimet, Hahn, and Rice 2005). 
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Figure 14.  The May 2005 Seaweb ARIES (Acoustic Radio Interactive Exploratory 
Server) Experiment in Monterey Bay (From Ouimet, Hahn, and Rice 2005). 
The general application of the Seaweb infrastructure is well adapted for the use of 
modem-based navigation aids.  This concept allows the use of the acoustic modems to 
pass to a UUV its geoposition while also providing full connectivity to the outside world.  
The combination of acoustic communications and modem-based navigation aids is 
illustrated in Figure 15, which shows a UUV (or a surface ship) simultaneously 
reacquiring a Smart Marker and being directed by the Directional Acoustic Transponder 
(DAT) (Green 2007). 
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Figure 15.  Conceptual operations among a UUV, surface ship, Directional Acoustic 
Transponder (DAT), and Smart Marker (From Green 2007). 
In May 2009, the Seaweb network was implemented in the San Francisco Bay.  
This pilot experiment demonstrated a practical application of real-time underwater 
acoustic networks.  Despite the difficult environment, the network was successfully 
deployed and for two weeks was able to gather current and other environmental data that 
were valuable in understanding the unique environment in the bay. However, the live 
networking piece of the experiment was not successful and this is where the research in 
optimally employing these networks is so valuable to allow the full use of the information 
and advantage that can be gained through these underwater acoustic networks.  Figure 16 
shows the implementation of San Francisco Bayweb 2009 (Ramp et. al. 2009). 
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Figure 16.  The collaboration of many universities and state and federal agencies came 
together in the implementation of San Francisco Bayweb in May 2009 
(From Ramp et. al. 2009). 
The Seaweb network has been successfully deployed in over 50 sea trials. (Ramp 
et al. 2009)  Other implementations include FRONT-3 from March to June 2001, Seaweb 
2001, FRONT-4 from January to June 2002, Seaweb 2002, Seaweb 2005 UUV 
experiments in July 2005 in Monterey Bay and December 2005 in St Andrews Bay, 
Seaweb 2005, Seaweb 2008, Unet 2006, 2007, 2008, NGAS 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 
2012, and MISSION 2012 in Singapore Strait. 
D. DEEP SEAWEB 
Seaweb operations can be extended to the deep ocean by exploiting the 
characteristics of the deep ocean, specifically the Deep Sound Channel (DSC) and 
 26 
reliable acoustic path (RAP) phenomena.  These concepts are explored in detail in Scott 
Thompson’s thesis, “Sound Propogation Considerations for a Deep Ocean Acoustic 
Network” in December 2009 and are summarized here. 
1. Reliable Acoustic Path 
Of the several paths available, frequently one will be more dominant due to 
minimum transmission losses (Urick 1983).  An example of these dominant paths is 
known as reliable acoustic path (RAP).  This phenomenon is exploited by using the direct 
path between deep source and shallow receiver, or vice versa.  These moderate ranges are 
achieved because the sound travels over specific paths that are not sensitive to near-
surface effects or losses from reflection as in “bottom-bounce” propagation.  Example 
RAPs are shown in Figure 17 (Urick 1983). 
 
Figure 17.   Reliable acoustic paths from a deep source to shallow receivers 
(From Urick 1983). 
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2. Deep Sound Channel 
This phenomenon is the result of the sound-speed profile of the deep ocean.  
Sound speed is minimum at a specific depth depending largely on the latitude.  
Refraction focuses the sound waves in the ocean according to Snell’s Law, bending them 
toward the depth of the minimum velocity.  When an acoustic source is located at or near 
the depth of minimum velocity, the sound waves are trapped in the deep sound channel 
(DSC) and propagate to great distances.  The axis of the DSC is the depth at which the 
minimum velocity occurs (Urick 1983). 
Following World War II, Ewing and Worzel explored the characteristics of the 
DSC.  The DSC was utilized in the SOFAR (sound fixing and ranging) system to rescue 
aviators that went down at sea.  The aviator could drop a small explosive charge and the 
acoustic signal could be received thousands of miles away.  Using receipts at two or more 
stations provided a cross-fix of the location of detonation.  Ewing and Worzel published a 
ray diagram like that in Figure 18 that was originally drawn by hand for a sound source at 
4,000 ft that clearly indicates a zone at 32 1/2 miles where the sound waves from several 
propagation paths converge to produce a convergence zone.  These ray traces are now 
computer created as shown in Figure 19 (Urick 1983). 
Because the path that each sound wave travels can vary so much, there is 
significant distortion of acoustic signals transmitted in the DSC.  As an example, an 
experiment in 1963 using 4-pound explosive sources dropped from an aircraft and 
detonated at the DSC axis in Bermuda demonstrated how much distortion can be 
introduced by sound traveling along the DSC.  Even though the explosive pulse was 
initially very short, the received acoustic signal 1,000 miles away was spread to 9.4 
seconds. (Urick 1983)  Several modulation techniques can handle the multipath 
propagation: frequency hopping, multi-channel M-ary frequency-shift keyed (MFSK), 
and M-ary phase-shift-keyed (MPSK) to name a few (Kilfoyle and Baggeroer Jan 2000). 
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Figure 18.  Ray diagram of transmission in the deep sound channel (DSC) 
for a source on the axis (From Urick 1983). 
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Figure 19.  Computer generated ray diagram of the DSC for a source near the axis. 
  Reflected rays are omitted (From Urick 1983). 
Another advantage of utilizing the DSC is its nearly global availability as shown 
in Figure 20, a worldwide map showing DSC axis depths.  The DSC axis is around 1000 
meters deep (3,280 feet) in the midlatitudes but can be very near the surface near polar 
regions (Munk and Forbes 1989). 
 
Figure 20.  Worldwide DSC axis depths in meters (From Munk and Forbes 1989). 
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3. Deep Seaweb Concept 
The Deep Seaweb concept is similar to that of Seaweb but it exploits the DSC as 
shown in Figure 21 to provide longer links and greater area coverage. 
 
Figure 21.  Deep Seaweb concept illustration (From Rice 
unpublished Deep Seaweb presentation). 
The DSC is deep enough to avoid being a hazard to navigation.  The DSC can 
also provide fairly stealthy channels of communication between submerged, surface, and 
air assets.  It is possible for submarines to participate in the communication network with 
messaging over long distances and connections to command centers via a gateway node 
at a more secure or more remote location. 
The gateway node could be an unmanned surface vehicle (USV), a moored 
surface or subsurface buoy that is linked to an airborne asset via lasers or radio 
frequency, a cabled seafloor modem, or a manned surface vessel.  Paul Blodgett analyzed 
the use of lasers to communicate with submarines in his thesis, “Submarine Laser 
Communication Options and the Impact of Light Refraction at the Air-Sea Interface” in 
September 2009.  Lasers could be used to communicate with a subsurface gateway node 
























in a distributed undersea Seaweb infrastructure instead of linking directly with the 
submarine. 
There are several factors that need to be considered when exploring the use of a 
moored gateway buoy.  One important factor is the effect of ocean currents on the long 
tether that anchors the acoustic modem and transducer to the sea floor.  Scott Thompson 
explored this aspect in detail in his thesis “Displacement of tethered hydro-acoustic 
modems by uniform horizontal currents” in December 2009. 
Another important factor to consider is longevity since these buoys are battery 
powered.  There are several options that could increase the operational time buoys and 
acoustic modems are able to remain in service.  There have been great advances in 
developing regimens to conserve battery power by utilizing low power states and more 
efficient electronic components that have greatly increased the service life.  To 
compliment these advances, there are several options that could be used to recharge the 
batteries on station rather than replace them, which would be very expensive in time and 
resources for modems and buoys deployed in the deep ocean.  One option is to utilize a 
microbial fuel cell.  On April 22, 2010, for an Earth Day event at the Pentagon, the Office 
of Naval Research (ONR) showcased such a microbial fuel cell that converts “naturally 
occurring fuels and oxidants in the marine environment into electricity, offering a clean, 
efficient and reliable alternative to batteries and other environmentally harmful fuels” 
(Office of Naval Research 2010). ONR Program Manager Dr. Linda Chrisey made the 
following observations:  
Think of it as a battery that runs on mud. They are sustainable, 
environmentally friendly and don't involve hazardous reactants like a 
regular battery might because they use the natural carbon in the marine 
environment. For example, we are working on a 4-foot long autonomous 
underwater vehicle that will settle on the seafloor and recharge its batteries 
using this fuel cell approach. We are already able to power many types of 
sensors using microbial fuel cells. (Office of Naval Research 2010) 
Another option is to have a solar panel with a buoyancy controlled feature that 
would allow periodic recharging.  It is also possible to harness the energy available in the 
ocean currents to run a small generator for recharging.  While each of these options has 
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its advantages, the microbial fuel cell seems to be very promising and it was named as 
one of TIME magazine’s “Top 50 Inventions for 2009” (Office of Naval Research 2010). 
The standard Deep Seaweb acoustic modems are the same as those used for 
Seaweb, commercially available Teledyne Benthos acoustic modems that operate in the 
9-14 kHz band.  Although the ocean floor depth is around 8,000 meters (26,246 feet) in 
some places, 4,000 meters (13,123 feet) is a typical ocean depth as shown in Figure 22 
(Amante and Eakins 2009).  Using a typical DSC axis depth of 1,000 meters (3,280 feet), 
the cable that anchors the transducer and acoustic modem will be approximately 3,000 
meter (9,842 feet) long.  The acoustic modem setup that Thompson analyzed in detail in 
both theses is shown in Figure 23. 
 





Figure 23.  Acoustic modem composition used for Thompson’s DSC analysis 
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III. NETWORK MODEL FORMULATION 
A. DESIGNING A RESILIENT NETWORK 
1. Network Setup 
The wireless Seaweb underwater network can be set up in any geometric 
arrangement, as indicated in the various applications mentioned in chapter II.  In order to 
create a finite representation that can be optimized, we decided to use a small square area 
measuring 75 km x 75 km (40.5 nm x 40.5 nm) in a generic patch of ocean that has a 
typical sound velocity profile.  We divide the area into a 5km x 5km (2.7nm x 2.7nm) 
grid, placing an acoustic modem only at a node, defined as the center of one of the 225 
square patches defined by the grid.  Each grid square diagonal is 7.07 km (3.8 nm).  The 
number of gateway nodes and access point nodes in any scenario is fixed and each is 
placed at a predetermined location.  A fixed number of repeater nodes are available for 
placement at other, unoccupied nodes.  Each acoustic modem has a maximum effective 
range of about 25 km, (13.5 nm); if two modems are placed within range of each other a 
connection can be established between them, and we represent this possibility as an arc 
between two nodes whose Euclidean distance is less than or equal to the maximum 
effective range. 
We also assume that each node in the network is a potential attack location, at 
which an adversary can detonate ordnance (e.g., a depth charge).  We assume that the 
detonation corresponding to such an attack will damage nearby modems and render them 
unusable.  Any damage radius can be used; for the purposes of our study, we assume that 
an attack at any node disables modems placed at any of the eight adjacent (orthogonally 
and diagonally) nodes. 
The goal of our model is to determine locations for repeaters so that each access 
point is connected to at least one gateway node through a sequence of modems within 
range of each other.  We do this by establishing a unit of communications traffic at each 
access point, and having the model place repeaters at nodes to minimize the number of 
undeliverable units of traffic, where traffic will be routed along arcs that connect nodes 
occupied by repeaters. 
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This network design must consider a set of possible attacks by a rational, 
malicious adversary, the attacker, who chooses a set of nodes to attack and whose goal is 
the exact opposite of that of the network designer, who we call the defender: to maximize 
the costs (including penalties) of delivering messages from each of the access points to 
any gateway node.  We define the set of feasible attacks for the attacker through a simple 
budget constraint limiting the number of nodes he can attack.  However, this can be 
generalized to any set of constraints we wish to place on the attacker’s operations, based 
on our estimation of his capability to launch simultaneous attacks against our network. 
We present the following monolithic tri-level optimization problem, which we 
refer to as a defender-attacker-defender (DAD) model, for optimizing the design of a 
communications network that is resilient to attack.  Although such problems cannot be 
solved directly, we develop a decomposition algorithm and several related problem 
formulations that we use to determine optimal solutions to this problem. 
2. Sets and Indices 
iN   potential sites for relays (alias j) or attacks (alias i’, j’) or source 
nodes (alias k) 
i, j A  potential communication arcs; pairs of sites that are within range of 
each other {alias (j,i)} 
S N  access points (source nodes) for messages 
\T N S  gateway (exit) nodes for the network 
iV N    set of nodes that affect node i when attacked 
3. Data 
q  penalty for each undelivered packet 
p  penalty on each packet sent across an attacked arc 
max_repeaters  maximum number of repeaters to emplace (including access 
points and gateways) 
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max_attacks maximum number of attacks  
4. Variables [type] 
Ek undelivered messages remaining at any source node k [nonnegative] 
Xi’ 1 if node i’ is attacked. [binary] 
Yij
k
 messages originating from source node k sent across (i,j)  [nonnegative] 
Fi
k
 messages from a source node k undelivered to any gateway node t 
[nonnegative] 
Ri 1 if modem emplaced at node i, includes access points, gateway nodes, 
and relay nodes [binary] 
5. Formulation SUBNET_DAD: 
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The objective function (T1) assesses a penalty of q units per undelivered message 
from each source node and calculates the total number of hops taken by the delivered 
messages to get to their destination; it also includes a penalty of p units for each attacked 
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arc traversed by a message.  Constraints (T2) maintain balance of flow at each node i for 
each individual message tagged by its source node, k.  There is one constraint (T3) for 
every pair of k and Ri that requires a repeater be placed at the (non-source, non-gateway) 
tail node of any arc that transmits messages; in practice the R variables are fixed for 
source and gateway nodes, so the corresponding control constraints are not required in 
any of the formulations.  Constraints (T4) and (T5) place a ceiling on the total number of 
repeater nodes and max number of attacks, respectively.  Constraint (T6) establishes each 
individual message flow as a nonnegative variable.  Constraints (T7) and (T8) establish 
each Xi’ and Ri as a binary variable. 
For an actual laydown in a known geographic area, nodes can be located 
anywhere in that area and a sound propagation model can be run for each pair of nodes to 
determine connectivity: if modems placed at two nodes could establish a viable 
communications channel, then the arc between these two points is added to the set A.  In 
our simple grid example, the set A of potential communication arcs is calculated using a 
constant, sidelen, that determines the distance between adjacent cells, in nm, and a 
constant, maxdist, that gives the maximum range in nm between repeaters that 
communicate with each other.  The propagation model provides the basis for that 
maximum range. 
In a scenario with multiple gateway nodes, we connect each gateway node to one 
“central gateway node” with zero cost, invulnerable arcs (i.e., for such an arc (i,j), both Vi 
and Vj are empty) so even though the actual gateway nodes will be modeled t T N  , 
the code incorporates the “central gateway node” as t N .  This allows a message 
originating at an access node to exit the system at any one of the gateway nodes. 
B. SOLVING SUBNET_DAD WITH DECOMPOSITION 
In order to solve SUBNET_DAD, we propose a decomposition algorithm in 
which the subproblem solves for the optimal attack against any fixed network design, and 
the master problem builds a design that is resilient to each attack seen so far.  We first 
formulate the attacker subproblem, which is simply SUBNET_DAD with the design 
variables, R, fixed, and is therefore a two-level optimization problem we refer to as an 
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attacker-defender (AD) model.  In this model, we define a fixed design through a new set 
of parameters representing a fixed design, use those parameters in place of the R 
variables, modify the objective (T1) and constraints (T3), and drop constraints (T4) and 
(T8): 
1. New Data 
iR  1 if modem emplaced at node i, 0 otherwise (a fixed design) [binary] 
2. Formulation SUBNET_AD: 
 
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This formulation still cannot be solved directly, but a simple, standard 
reformulation converts it to an integer programming problem.  For fixed values of both 
the R and X variables, the resulting optimization problem is an amalgamation of several 
minimum-cost network flow problems, one per source node, that models the routing (or 
non-routing, as appropriate) of each message through the existing, attacked network.  In 
this case constraints (T2), (T3’), and (T6) define the feasible region for the operator’s 
flow problem.  For a fixed design, , and a fixed attack plan, , the network operator 
faces the following message routing problem: 
R X
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4. New Data 
'iX  1 if node i’ attacked, 0 otherwise (a fixed attack plan) [binary] 
5. Formulation SUBNET_ROUTING: 
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This is a linear programming problem, and we have indicated dual variable names 
for each constraint.  The objective (T1’’) is now a pure minimization in the flow and 
artificial variables.  We have dropped constraints (T5) and (T7), as the attack is fixed, and 
the rest of the model is the same as before. 
We are now in a position to take the dual of this routing formulation, and then 
replace the attack parameters with decision variables to yield a pure maximization integer 
programming problem: 
 41 
7. Formulation SUBNET_AD_DUALILP: 
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The DAD objective function takes the input from the objective function for the 
Operator Model then provides input to the solution to cut d of the DAD Model (D1) 
provides optimum solution of the DAD Model.  Constraint (D2) maintains balance of 
flow at each node, where each access point, s, has one unit of supply, and must connect to 
at least one gateway node, t.  Constraints (D3) and (D4) require that repeaters be placed 
at both endpoints of any arc that is used for communication.  Constraint (D5) places a 
ceiling on maximum number of attacks.  Constraints (D6) establish each Xi’ as a binary 
variable.  Constraints (D7) establish each ik  as a nonnegative variable. 
For any fixed design, this model can be solved with commercial, off-the-shelf 
optimization software such as GAMS (General Algebraic Modeling System) (GAMS, 
2013) and CPLEX Optimizer (IBM, 2013).  SUBNET_AD_DUALILP serves as the 
subproblem for our decomposition algorithm, and with it in place, we now provide the 
master problem formulation. 
C. MASTER PROBLEM FORMULATION 
Our master problem includes design decision variables, R, from the original 
formulation, and keeps track of the attack found by the subproblem at each iteration, d.  
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For each of these attacks, it maintains a separate set of flow and artificial variables, 
indexed by the iteration, so that it can determine the optimal routing response to each 
attack.  It is a network design problem in which the design chosen is evaluated against 
each of a finite set of attacks, and therefore determines the design that is resilient to the 
worst-case attack out of all the attacks it has seen so far. 
1. Sets and Indices 




  1 if node i’ attacked in iteration d, 0 otherwise 
D  number of iterations 
3. Variables [type] 
DADZ  DAD master problem objective function value [free] 
EDk
d
 undelivered messages remaining at any access point node s in 
response to attack from iteration d [nonnegative] 
YD ij
kd




 messages undelivered to any gateway node i in response to attack 
from iteration d [nonnegative] 
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The DAD master problem objective (M0) represents the operating cost resulting 
from the worst-case attack.  Each cut constraint (M1) provides a lower bound on the 
worst-case cost based on a particular attack plan, 
d
X , and the associated flows YD
kd
 
representing the operator’s optimal re-routing of that message in response to that attack 
plan.  Constraints (M2) enforce balance of flow for each node and each message, for each 
attack plan.  Constraints (M3) require a repeater node be established at the tail node of 
any arc that carries flow, for each attack plan.  Constraint (M4) limits the total number of 
repeaters used in the network design.  Constraints (M6) establish each 
kd
ijYD  as a 
nonnegative variable.  Constraints (M8) establish each Ri as a binary variable. 
When solving SUBNET_DAD using Benders decomposition, we can encounter a 
repeated attack from the subproblem (since the subproblem itself is an integer linear 
program, the optimal attack in response to a given suboptimal defense might be one 
we’ve seen before), which immediately leads to cycling and a failure to converge.  To 
prevent this, we create a version of the SUBNET_DUALILP subproblem with an 














   
These constraints use the iteration index, d, defined in the master problem, and, 
when solving the subproblem at iteration D, they make use of the stored attack plans 
d
iX  
from the previous iterations, 1 d D  .  The constraints (D8) require that the current 
attack not target at least one node that was targeted in each of the prior attacks.  We refer 
to this version as SUBNET_DUALILP_UNIQUE. 
D. ALGORITHM 
Using the models just described, the following algorithm solves for the optimal 
placement of repeaters at nodes, and, as a by-product, an optimal attack for that specific 
network configuration. 
1. Variables used in the algorithm not previously defined [type] 
  incumbent defense 
R   current defense to use in the AD subproblem 
  attack corresponding to the incumbent defense 
ub_DAD upper bound for DAD model [nonnegative] 
lb_DAD lower bound for DAD model [nonnegative] 
epsilon_DAD relative tolerance for the DAD model [nonnegative] 
2. Algorithm SUBNET_DECOMP 
Solve SUBNET_DESIGN for R, Y, E, F, ZDAD 
lb_DAD = ZDAD 
ub_DAD = +  
R R , bestR R ,
bestX  0  
D =1 
While ub_DAD – lb_DAD > epsilon_DAD*lb_DAD 






 If ub_DAD > ZAD 
  Update ub_DAD = ZAD 
  Update incumbent defense, bestR R  
  Record attack corresponding to incumbent defense, '
best
iX  
 If not first iteration (i.e., D >1) 
  Compare X to each , 1dX d D   
  If dX X  for some d  
   Solve SUBNET_DUALILP_UNIQUE for X, ,  , ZAD 
 Record next (unique) attack: DX X  
Solve SUBNET_DAD_MASTER for R, YD, ED, FD, ZDAD  
 If  lb_DAD < ZDAD 
  Update lb_DAD = ZDAD 
 Update current design R R  
 D = D + 1 
Solve SUBNET_ROUTING (with ,
best bestR R X X  ) to recover Y, E, F 
3. Discussion 
Algorithm SUBNET_DECOMP uses the standard structure of Benders 
decomposition with a modified subproblem (here, SUBNET_DUALILP_UNIQUE) that 
guarantees a unique, if suboptimal, attack plan, given a list of prior attack plans 
previously enumerated.  Although this modified subproblem does not generate valid 
bounds (and therefore cannot be used to update the incumbent), it does guarantee that 
every possible attack plan that uses all available attacks will eventually be enumerated.  If 
the subproblem becomes infeasible due to these constraints, then we must have 
enumerated all possible attacks and therefore the incumbent solution is optimal.  Each 
suboptimal attack generates a valid cut for the master problem, and will eventually 
provide enough guidance (possibly through an exhaustive enumeration of all possible 
cuts) to converge. 
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IV. RESULTS, CONCLUSIONS, AND FUTURE WORK 
A. RESULTS 
This analysis is based on the small 15 by 15 node network with the access point 
nodes, s, and the gateway nodes, t, in predetermined locations as mentioned in chapter 
III.  The location of the repeater nodes, r, are determined by initially solving the network 
design problem.  This network is indexed by row and column and numbered from left to 
right and top to bottom.  To further examine the effect of access point and gateway node 
placement, four configurations, A through D, were used.  The location of each node will 
be referenced by row and column in this format (row, column).  For instance, a node in 
row 5, column 10 will be written as (5, 10). 
For this 15 by 15 network, the numerical values used in the GAMS code are 
summarized in Table 1. 
Table 1.   Numerical values for data used in the GAMS code. 
Data Term  Definition 
Value for this 15 by 15 
network 
q penalty for each undelivered packet 12 
p 




maximum number of repeaters to emplace 
(including access points and gateways) 
up to 30 
max_attacks maximum number of attacks varied from 2 to 9 
epsilon_DAD relative tolerance for the DAD model varied from 0.15 to 2 
Recall that each attack has an area effect which disables the attacked node and all 
adjacent nodes.  Introducing the possibility of two attacks will show some common 
effects regardless of the placement of access point and gateway nodes.  Further analysis 
is done on each configuration to determine the number of attacks required to completely 
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block all flow in the network.  The value of epsilon_DAD was varied in order for the 
model to converge on a solution for some of the configurations. 
The optimal placement of repeater nodes with and without two attacks for each 
configuration is shown in Figures 24 through 42, where the nodes are labeled according 
to Table 2.  The various configurations of access point nodes and gateway nodes are 
summarized in Tables 3 through 6. 
Table 2.   Labeling key for the network configurations in Figures 24 through 42. 
S access point node 
T gateway node 
R repeater node 
X attacked node 
R X attacked repeater node 
 node disabled from the area effect of an adjacent attacked node 
1. Configuration A 
Table 3.   Configuration A for placement of s and t nodes. 
Node Type Site Row Column 
s n016 2 1 
s n113 8 8 
s n211 15 1 
t n015 1 15 
t n225 15 15 
The initial solution to the network routing problem with 5 repeater nodes and 
without any attacks for configuration A is shown in Figure 24. 
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 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
1               T 
2 S     R     R     
3                
4                
5                
6                
7                
8        S        
9                
10                
11                
12           R     
13                
14                
15 S     R    R     T 
Figure 24.  Optimal node placement without any attacks for configuration A (with 5 
repeater nodes). 
With two attacks, the attacker can completely isolate the t node in (1, 15).  The 
repeater nodes in (5, 12) and (11, 12) are disabled but the flow that would go through 
these nodes is redirected and all s nodes are still connected to at least one t node.  Figure 
25 illustrates the resulting network configuration with 6 repeater nodes. 
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 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
1               T 
2 S               
3                
4           X     
5            R    
6    R            
7                
8        S        
9                
10           X     
11    R        R    
12                
13                
14                
15 S     R     R    T 
Figure 25.  Optimal node placement with two attacks for configuration A (with 6 repeater 
nodes and no s nodes blocked). 
With four attacks, the attacker can completely isolate the t node in (1, 15) and 
block all flow from the s node in (2, 1).  Even though there are multiple disabled repeater 
nodes, the flow from the s nodes in (15, 1) and (8, 8) is rerouted to the t node in (15, 15).  
If the repeater at (6, 4) had been placed at (7, 3) then if all else remained the same, the s 
node at (2, 1) would have a link to the t node in (15, 15).  However, if the repeater node 
had been placed at (7, 3) instead of (6, 4), the algorithm would have placed the attacks 
differently and evaluated the resulting solution to be less optimal than the final solution.  




 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
1    R    R       T 
2 S     R      X R   
3   R    R    R R R   
4             X   
5     R    R   R    
6    R            
7                
8        S        
9                
10                
11   R    R R X  X R R   
12     R 
 
    R R     
13                
14   R           R  
15 S     R     R    T 
Figure 26.  Optimal node placement with four attacks for configuration A (with 25 
repeater nodes and one s node blocked). 
With six attacks, the attacker can completely isolate the t node in (15, 15) and 
block all flow from the s nodes in (2, 1) and (15, 1).  Despite multiple disabled repeater 
nodes, the flow from the s nodes in (8, 8) is rerouted to the t node in (1, 15).  One of the 
attacks is on the repeater node in (4, 11).  Figure 27 illustrates the resulting network 
configuration A with 25 repeater nodes and two s nodes blocked. 
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 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
1       R     R   T 
2 S               
3        R     R   
4   X        R/X     
5    R     R R    R  
6                
7                
8        S    R    
9                
10             X   
11    R     R   R  R  
12     X R    X R    R 
13  R   R      R     
14       X         
15 S     R  R  R R  R  T 
Figure 27.  Optimal node placement with six attacks for configuration A (with 25 repeater 
nodes and two s nodes blocked). 
With seven attacks, the attacker can completely isolate both t nodes and block all 
flow from all s nodes.  One of the attacks is on the repeater node in (12, 11).  Figure 28 
illustrates the resulting network configuration with 5 repeater nodes and all flow blocked 
in the network.  Although it may appear that the addition of only a few nodes near the t 
node at (15, 15) could provide conductivity in the network, the full story comes in the 
effect of increasing the maximum number of attacks from 6 in Figure 27 to 7 in Figure 
28.  The addition of one more attack blocks the only remaining flow in the network from 
the s node at (8, 8) ensuring that there is no solution that provides connectivity even if all 
25 repeater nodes were used.  This is reflected when the algorithm places minimum 
repeater nodes and groups the attacks.  The only way to provide flow in the network is to 
increase the number of repeater nodes available.  When there are sufficient attacks to 
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block all flow in the network, the algorithm provides similar solutions for configurations 
B, C, and D. 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
1     X          T 
2 S     R     R     
3                
4                
5                
6                
7                
8        S        
9                
10                
11          X X X    
12          X R/X     
13                
14     X           
15 S     R    R     T 
Figure 28.  Optimal node placement with seven attacks for configuration A (with 5 
repeater nodes and all flow blocked in the network). 
2. Configuration B 
Table 4.   Configuration B for placement of s and t nodes. 
Node Type Site Row Column 
s n015 1 15 
s n113 8 8 
s n211 15 1 
t n001 1 1 
t n225 15 15 
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The initial solution to the network routing problem without any attacks for 
configuration B is shown in Figure 29 with 7 repeater nodes. 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
1 T              S 
2                
3           R     
4                
5     R           
6 R              R 
7                
8        S        
9                
10 R               
11               R 
12           R     
13                
14                
15 S              T 
Figure 29.  Optimal node placement without any attacks for configuration B (with 7 
repeater nodes). 
With two attacks, the attacker can completely isolate the t node in (1, 15).  The 
repeater nodes in (4, 5), (5, 4), and (11, 12) are disabled.  The flow from the s nodes in (1, 
15) and (8, 8) are redirected so all s nodes are still connected to at least one t node.  
Figure 30 illustrates the resulting network configuration with 13 repeater nodes and no s 
nodes blocked when there were 15 repeater nodes available.  Since all s nodes are 




 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
1 T     R    R     S 
2                
3                
4    X R           
5    R        R   R 
6 R               
7                
8        S        
9                
10           X    R 
11 R           R    
12     R           
13                
14                
15 S     R    R     T 
Figure 30.  Optimal node placement with two attacks for configuration B (with 13 
repeater nodes and no s nodes blocked). 
With four attacks, the attacker is able to completely isolate the t node in (15, 15) 
and block all flow from s node in (1, 15).  Even though there are multiple disabled 
repeater nodes, the flow from s nodes in (8, 8) and (1, 15) is rerouted so that they are still 
connected to one t node.  Figure 31 illustrates the resulting network configuration with 13 
repeater nodes and no s nodes blocked when there were 15 repeater nodes available.  
Since all s nodes are connected, the additional 2 repeater nodes are not necessary to 
provide flow in the network. 
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 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
1 T    X R     R    S 
2                
3                
4     R      R     
5    R          X R 
6                
7                
8        S        
9           R     
10   X            R 
11                
12           R     
13                
14          X      
15 S     R     R    T 
Figure 31.  Optimal node placement with four attacks for configuration B (with 13 
repeater nodes and no s nodes blocked). 
With six attacks, the attacker is able to completely isolate the t node in (1, 1) and 
block all flow from the s nodes in (1, 15) and (8, 8).  Even though there are multiple 
disabled repeater nodes, the flow from the s node in (1, 15) is rerouted so that it is still 
connected to one t node.  One of the attacks is on the repeater node in (6, 1).  Figure 32 
illustrates the resulting network configuration with 21 repeater nodes and two s nodes 
blocked.  Here since the s nodes at (15, 1) and (8, 8) are completely blocked, flow in the 
network would not improve even if all 25 repeater nodes were used. 
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 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
1 T     R    R     S 
2                
3                
4   X        X     
5    R        R   R 
6 R/X               
7                
8        S   X     
9            R    
10    R           R 
11 R        R   R/X    
12        R R  R  R   
13     R         R  
14         X       
15 S    R     R     T 
Figure 32.  Optimal node placement with six attacks for configuration B (with 21 repeater 
nodes and two s nodes blocked). 
With seven attacks, the attacker can completely isolate both t nodes and block all 
flow from all s nodes. Figure 33 illustrates the resulting network configuration with 7 
repeater nodes and all flow blocked the network even though up to 25 repeater nodes 
were available.  This is the same result and discussion as in configuration A for Figures 
27 and 28 where all flow in the network is blocked. 
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 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
1 T              S 
2                
3           R     
4    X            
5     R           
6 R              R 
7                
8        S        
9 X               
10 R             X  
11          X X X   R 
12          X R     
13                
14                
15 S              T 
Figure 33.  Optimal node placement with seven attacks for configuration B (with 7 
repeater nodes and all flow blocked the network). 
3. Configuration C 
Table 5.   Configuration C for placement of s and t nodes. 
Node Type Site Row Column 
s n008 1 8 
s n113 8 8 
s n218 15 8 
t n106 8 1 
t n120 8 15 
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The initial solution to the network routing problem without any attacks for 
configuration C is shown in Figure 34 with two repeater nodes. 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
1        S        
2                
3                
4                
5           R     
6                
7                
8 T       S       T 
9                
10                
11           R     
12                
13                
14                
15        S        
Figure 34.  Optimal node placement without any attacks for configuration C (with 2 
repeater nodes). 
With two attacks, the attacker can only disable the two repeater nodes in (5, 5) 
and (5, 11).  The flow from the s nodes in (1, 8) and (8, 8) are redirected so all s nodes are 
still connected to at least one t node.  Figure 35 illustrates the resulting network 
configuration with 7 repeater nodes and no s nodes blocked. 
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 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
1        S        
2                
3                
4    X      X      
5     R   R   R     
6                
7                
8 T       S       T 
9     R           
10                
11           R     
12    R   R         
13                
14                
15        S        
Figure 35.  Optimal node placement with two attacks for configuration C (with 7 repeater 
nodes and no s nodes blocked). 
With four attacks, the attacker can only disable five of the repeater nodes.  The 
flow from the s nodes in (8, 1) and (8, 8) are redirected and the flow from the s node in 
(15, 8) goes through a different repeater node so all of the S nodes are still connected to 
at least one t node.  Figure 36 illustrates the resulting network configuration with 8 
repeater nodes and no s nodes blocked when there were 25 repeater nodes available.  
Since all s nodes are connected, the additional 17 repeater nodes are not necessary to 
provide flow in the network. 
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 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
1        S        
2                
3                
4     X R    X      
5     R   R   R     
6                
7    X            
8 T    R   S       T 
9                
10    X            
11     R   R        
12            R    
13                
14                
15        S        
Figure 36.  Optimal node placement with four attacks for configuration C (with 8 repeater 
nodes and no s nodes blocked). 
With six attacks, the attacker can only disable nine of the repeater nodes and the 
resulting network flow maintains all of the s nodes connected to at least one t node.  
Figure 37 illustrates the resulting network configuration with 14 repeater nodes and no s 
nodes blocked when there are 25 repeater nodes available.  Since all s nodes are 




 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
1        S        
2     R           
3                
4    X      X      
5     R      R     
6  R      R        
7            X    
8 T   X R   S    R R  T 
9     R           
10                
11   X     R   R/X     
12    R        R    
13                
14             R   
15        S        
Figure 37.  Optimal node placement with six attacks for configuration C (with 14 repeater 
nodes and no s nodes blocked). 
With eight attacks, the attacker is able to block all flow from the s nodes in (1, 8) 
and (8, 8) and isolate the t node in (8, 1).  The flow from the s node in (15, 8) is 
redirected so it is still connected to at least one t node.  Two of the attacks are on the 
repeater nodes in (8, 10) and (11, 11).  Figure 38 illustrates the resulting network 
configuration with 15 repeater nodes and one s node blocked when there are 25 repeater 
nodes available.  Even if the other 10 repeater nodes were used, the algorithm evaluated 
the resulting solution would be suboptimal when compared to the final solution. 
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 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
1        S   X R    
2                
3           X    R 
4   X         R    
5   R R    R        
6                
7    X        X    
8 T    R   S  R/X   R  T 
9                
10                
11     R      R/X     
12    R X       R    
13               R 
14            R    
15        S        
Figure 38.  Optimal node placement with eight attacks for configuration C (with 15 
repeater nodes and one s node blocked). 
With nine attacks, the attacker is able to completely isolate all flow from all t 
nodes and block all flow from all the s nodes.  One of the attacks is on the repeater node 
in (5, 11).  Figure 39 illustrates the resulting network configuration with only 2 repeater 
nodes and all flow blocked in the network when there are 25 repeater nodes available.  
This is the same result and discussion as in configuration A for Figures 27 and 28 where 
all flow in the network is blocked. 
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 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
1        S        
2                
3                
4          X X X    
5          X R/X     
6                
7                
8 T       S       T 
9                
10          X X X    
11          X R     
12                
13                
14                
15        S        
Figure 39.  Optimal node placement with nine attacks for configuration C (with 2 repeater 
nodes and all flow blocked in the network). 
4. Configuration D 
Table 6.   Configuration D for placement of s and t nodes. 
Node Type Site Row Column 
s n211 15 1 
s n218 15 8 
s n225 15 15 
t n004 1 4 
t n012 1 12 
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The initial solution to the network routing problem without any attacks for 
configuration D is shown in Figure 40 with 7 repeater nodes. 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
1    T        T    
2                
3                
4                
5    R           R 
6    R            
7                
8       R         
9                
10               R 
11    R            
12     R           
13                
14                
15 S       S       S 
Figure 40.  Optimal node placement without any attacks for configuration D (with 7 
repeater nodes). 
With two attacks, the attacker isolates the t node in (1, 12).  The flow from the s 
nodes in (15, 1) and (15, 8) are redirected so all s nodes are still connected to at least one 
t node.  Figure 41 illustrates the resulting network configuration with 20 repeater nodes 
and no s nodes blocked when there were 25 repeater nodes available.  Since all s nodes 




 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
1    T        T    
2                
3                
4                
5     X R  R   X    R 
6    R        R    
7                
8                
9 R       R        
10 R    R   R R      R 
11    R            
12    R       R     
13         R    R   
14                
15 S    R R  S  R     S 
Figure 41.  Optimal node placement with two attacks for configuration D (with 20 
repeater nodes and no s nodes blocked). 
With four attacks, the attacker is able to completely isolate all s nodes.  Figure 42 
illustrates the resulting network configuration with 7 repeater nodes and all flow blocked 
in the network even though up to 25 repeater nodes were available.  This is the same 
result and discussion as in configuration A for Figures 27 and 28 where all flow in the 
network is blocked. 
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 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
1    T        T    
2                
3                
4              X  
5    R           R 
6    R            
7   X X  X          
8       R         
9                
10               R 
11    R            
12     R           
13                
14                
15 S       S       S 
Figure 42.  Optimal node placement with four attacks for configuration D (with 7 repeater 
nodes and all flow blocked in the network). 
B. CONCLUSIONS 
While the flow of none of the network configurations are completely blocked by 
two attacks, by comparing the resulting node placements it is possible to draw some 
general conclusions.  Configurations A and D are more affected by attacks than 
configurations B and C.  The t nodes in configurations A and D are on the same 
geometric side whereas the t nodes for configurations B and C are on opposite sides of 
the network coverage area.  The arrangement for A and D force the flow to only one of 
the two t nodes with more units of flow across fewer arcs, making it more vulnerable to 
further attacks and potentially slowing down the flow of information through the 
network. 
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Other conclusions can be drawn from the comparison of the various network 
configurations when all flow is completely blocked by attacks.  The three network 
configurations A, B, and C that have at least one of the access point nodes, s, in the 
middle of the geographic area are much more resilient than network configuration D 
which has all the s nodes on the same side of the area.  Also, network configuration C is 
the one with the most (nearly identical) options with all the s nodes evenly spaced 
between two parallel sides, is the most resilient network configuration.  The number of 
attacks required to completely block all flow in the network is summarized in Table 7. 
Table 7.   Number of attacks required to completely block the flow in the network. 





Overall, this analysis demonstrates two important factors that determine the 
resiliency of a network against attack or disruption.  A network’s resilience is related to: 
1) the number of possible sources or destinations that are available in that network, and 2) 
the separation of those sources or destinations.  The algorithm developed in this thesis 
could be crucial in designing an underwater network that is constrained by geography or 
other environmental factors. 
C. FUTURE WORK 
There are several possibilities to further this research in optimizing networks.  
Currently the gams code can only be used on relatively small networks such as the 15 by 
15 network used as a basis for the analysis in this thesis with few s and t nodes.  This 
limitation prevents applying it to many practical applications such as public underwater 
acoustic communications networks, transportation networks, product distribution 
networks, airline schedules, and communication networks.  The code could be modified 
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to allow the user to enter a starting solution, simplifying the complexity of the 
calculations and speeding up the execution time of the algorithm.  
This work could be carried forward and improved by modifying the gams code to 
make the penalty terms distance related instead of being tied to the number of nodes 
travelled from source to destination.  This would also make the code easily adapted to 
larger networks regardless of node spacing or total number of nodes. 
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APPENDIX A.  ALGORITHM IMPLEMENTED IN GAMS CODE 
FOR NETWORK CONFIGURATION A WITH TWO ATTACKS 
$TITLE SUBNET - Robust design of a submarine communications network using 
acoustic modems 130228 
 
$STITLE Multicommodity network flow formulation, DAD with a dual-ILP 
formulation of the AD subproblem 
 




   SOLPRINT =      OFF, 
   DECIMALS =        1, 
   LIMCOL   =       0, 
   LIMROW   =       0, 
   RESLIM   =     3600, {max seconds} 
   ITERLIM  = 99999999, {max iterations} 
   OPTCR    =     0.01, 
   LP       =    CPLEX, 
   MIP      =    CPLEX 
 ; 
 
 FILE out /SUBNET_DAD_KILP.out/; 
 PUT out; 
 
 PUT 'SUBNET 2.0 130228' / ; 
 PUTCLOSE out; 
 
 file opt /cplex.opt/ ; 
 put opt; 
 put 'startalg 1' / ; 
 put 'subalg 1' / ; 
 put 'brdir 1' / ; 
 put '*mipemphasis 4' / ; {1 for feasibility, or 4 for hidden feasible 
solutions} 
 put 'cuts no' / ; 
 put 'heurfreq -1' / ; 
 put '*threads 0' / ; 
 put '*parallelmode 1' / ; 
 putclose opt; 
 
 put out; 
 SETS 
   n nodes / 
     n001*n225 
   / 
 
{this initial s and t placement is for network configuration A} 
   s(n) / 
     n016 
     n113 
     n211 
   / 
 
t(n) / 
     n015 
     n225 
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   / 
 
   arc(n,n) 
   impact(n,n) 





   q {cost for undelivered packet} 
   p {cost for delivering a packet over an attacked arc} 
   sidelen /5/ {distance between adjacent cells, nm} 
   maxdist /25/ {max distance between nodes for a connection to exist} 
   max_repeaters /11/ {remember to count the access points and the gateway!} 
   max_attacks /2/ {set this to 0 when solving for initial placement with no 
attacks, varied from 2 to 9 to find the number of attacks to completely block 
all flow in a network} 
   attack_arc /8/ {the effective radius of an attack, when a node i is attacked 
all adjacent nodes are affected} 
   card_t 
   card_s 
   rect_wd /15/ 
   rect_ht /15/ 
 ; 
 card_t = SUM(t(i),1); 
 card_s = SUM(s(i),1); 
 
 q = CEIL(rect_wd*sidelen/maxdist + rect_ht*sidelen/maxdist); 
 p = q+1; 
 
VARIABLES 
   Z 
; 
POSITIVE VARIABLES 
   E(i) 
   F(i,k) 




   d_x 
   d_y 
   dist 
   x_iter 
   r_iter 
   max_r_iters /30/ {varied up to 75 to obtain convergence, set this to 1 when 
solving for initial placement with no attacks} 
   lb_DAD 
   ub_DAD 
   lb_AD 
   ub_AD 
   is_error 
   epsilon_DAD 
   epsilon_DAD_M 




   xbar(iprime) 
   xbard(iprime,d) 
   rbar(i) 
   xbest(iprime) 
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   rbest(i) 
 ; 
 
 epsilon_DAD = 0.15; {this was varied to get converge for placements B, C, and 
D} 
 epsilon_AD  = 0.01; 
 epsilon_DAD_M = 0.05; 
 
{determining the arc set} 
 LOOP((i,j), 
   d_x = sidelen*ABS(MOD(ORD(i)-1,rect_wd)-MOD(ORD(j)-1,rect_wd)); 
   d_y = sidelen*ABS(CEIL(ORD(i)/rect_ht)-CEIL(ORD(j)/rect_ht)); 
   dist = SQRT(SQR(d_x)+SQR(d_y)); 
   if( dist<=maxdist, 
     arc(i,j) = yes; 
   ); 
 ); 
 
 {determining the subset of attacked nodes} 
 LOOP((i,iprime), 
   d_x = sidelen*ABS(MOD(ORD(i)-1,rect_wd)-MOD(ORD(iprime)-1,rect_wd)); 
   d_y = sidelen*ABS(CEIL(ORD(i)/rect_ht)-CEIL(ORD(iprime)/rect_ht)); 
   dist = SQRT(SQR(d_x)+SQR(d_y)); 
   if( dist<=attack_arc, 
     impact(i,iprime) = yes; 




   FLOW_OBJ 
   FLOW_BALANCE(i,k) 
   CONTROL_FLOW(i,k) 
   DESIGN_CONTROL_FLOW(i,k) 
   DESIGN_REPEATER_BUDGET 
   DUAL_OBJ 
   DUAL_Y(i,j,k) 
   DUAL_E(k) 
   DUAL_F(i,k) 
   DUAL_ATTACK_BUDGET 
   DUAL_UNIQUE_ATTACK(d) 
   DAD_OBJ 
   DAD_CUT(k,d) 
   DAD_FLOW_BALANCE(i,k,d) 
   DAD_CONTROL_FLOW(i,k,d) 
   DAD_REPEATER_BUDGET 




Z =E= q*SUM(s(i), E(i)) + 
             sum((i,j,k)$(arc(i,j) and s(k)), 
                  (1 + p*sum(iprime$(impact(i,iprime) and xbar(iprime)),1) 
                     + p*sum(jprime$(impact(j,jprime) and 
xbar(jprime)),1))*Y(i,j,k)) 
 ; 
 FLOW_BALANCE(i,k)$s(k).. {NODEPI(i,k)} 
   SUM(arc(i,j), Y(i,j,k)) - SUM(arc(j,i),Y(j,i,k)) + E(k)$sameas(i,k) + 
F(i,k)$t(i) =E=  1$sameas(i,k) 
 ; 
 CONTROL_FLOW(i,s(k))$(not s(i) and not t(i)).. {MU(i,k)} 




 MODEL SUBNET_OPERATOR / 
   FLOW_OBJ 
   FLOW_BALANCE 




   NODEPI(i,k) 
 ; 
 POSITIVE VARIABLES 
   MU(i,k) 
 ; 
 BINARY VARIABLES 




   Z =E= SUM(s(k), NODEPI(k,k)) - SUM((rbar(i),s(k)), MU(i,k)) 
 ; 
 
 DUAL_Y(i,j,k)$(arc(i,j) and s(k)).. 
   NODEPI(i,k) - NODEPI(j,k) - MU(i,k) 

















   SUM(xbard(iprime,d),X(iprime)) =L= max_attacks - 1 
 ; 
 
 MODEL SUBNET_DUALILP / 
   DUAL_OBJ 
   DUAL_Y 
   DUAL_E 
   DUAL_F 
   DUAL_ATTACK_BUDGET 
 /; 
 
 MODEL SUBNET_DUALILP_UNIQUE / 
   DUAL_OBJ 
   DUAL_Y 
   DUAL_E 
   DUAL_F 
   DUAL_ATTACK_BUDGET 




   Z_DAD(k) 
 75 
 ; 
 POSITIVE VARIABLES 
   YD(i,j,k,d) 
   FD(i,k,d) 
   ED(i,d) 
 ; 
 BINARY VARIABLES 




   Z =E= SUM(s(k), Z_DAD(k)) 
 ; 
 DAD_CUT(s(k),d)$(ORD(d)<=r_iter).. 
   Z_DAD(k) =G= q*ED(k,d) + 
             sum(arc(i,j), 
                  (1 + p*sum(iprime$(impact(i,iprime) and xbard(iprime,d)),1) 
                     + p*sum(jprime$(impact(j,jprime) and 
xbard(jprime,d)),1))*YD(i,j,k,d)) 
 ; 
 DAD_FLOW_BALANCE(i,k,d)$(s(k) and ORD(d)<=r_iter).. 
   SUM(arc(i,j), YD(i,j,k,d)) - SUM(arc(j,i),YD(j,i,k,d)) + ED(k,d)$sameas(i,k) 
+ FD(i,k,d)$t(i) =E=  1$sameas(i,k) 
 ; 
 DAD_CONTROL_FLOW(i,s(k),d)$(not s(i) and not t(i) and ORD(d)<=r_iter).. 
   SUM(arc(i,j), YD(i,j,k,d)) {+ ED(k,d)$sameas(i,k) + FD(i,k,d)$t(i)} =L= R(i) 
 ; 
 DAD_REPEATER_BUDGET.. 
   SUM(i,R(i)) =L= max_repeaters 
 ; 
 DAD_LB.. 
   SUM(s(k),Z_DAD(k)) =G= lb_DAD 
 ; 
 
 MODEL SUBNET_DAD_MASTER / 
   DAD_OBJ 
   DAD_CUT 
   DAD_FLOW_BALANCE 
   DAD_CONTROL_FLOW 
   DAD_REPEATER_BUDGET 
/; 
 
 DESIGN_CONTROL_FLOW(i,s(k))$(not s(i) and not t(i)).. 




   SUM(i,R(i)) =L= max_repeaters 
 ; 
 
 MODEL SUBNET_DESIGN / 
   FLOW_OBJ 
   FLOW_BALANCE 
   DESIGN_CONTROL_FLOW 
   DESIGN_REPEATER_BUDGET 
 /; 
 
 {Models up to here, rest of file is algorithm} 
 
*Protect s(i) and t(i) from attack 
 LOOP(impact(i,iprime)$(s(i) or t(i)), 




 SUBNET_DAD_MASTER.optcr = epsilon_DAD_M ; 
 
 SUBNET_DAD_MASTER.optfile = 1; 
 SUBNET_DUALILP.optcr = epsilon_AD; 
 
 SUBNET_DESIGN.optfile = 1; 
 
 xbar(i) = 0; 
 IF(max_repeaters < card(s)+card(t), 
   PUT 'Insufficient repeaters to build network.' / / ; 
 ELSE 
   LOOP(s(i), 
     R.fx(i) = 1; 
   ); 
   LOOP(t(i), 
     R.fx(i) = 1; 
   ); 
 
 {set initial solution Rbar} 
 {set initial bounds for DAD} 




   rbar(i) = yes; 
 ); 
 
 PUT SUM(i,R.L(i)):6:0,' Total Repeaters' / ; 
 PUT 'Initial Repeater Locations' / ; 
 PUT 'Site      Row       Column' / ; 
 LOOP(rbar(i), 
   PUT i.tl:7, (CEIL(ORD(i)/15)):8:0, (MOD(ORD(i)-1,15)+1):8:0 / ; 
 ); 
 PUT / ; 
 LOOP(i, 
     IF(rbar(i), 
       If(s(i), 
         PUT 'S ' ; 
       ); 
       IF(t(i), 
         PUT 'T ' ; 
       ); 
       IF(not t(i) and not s(i), 
         PUT 'R ' ; 
       ); 
     else 
       PUT '. '; 
     ); 
   if(MOD(ORD(i),15)=0, 
     PUT / ; 
   ); 
 ); 
 PUT / / ; 
 PUT 'Arc Flows' / ; 
 LOOP(arc(i,j)$(SUM(s(k),Y.L(i,j,k))>eps), 
   PUT i.tl:10, '  ', j.tl:10, '  ', (SUM(s(k),Y.L(i,j,k))):5:2 / ; 
 ); 
 PUT / / ; 
 
 PUT 'Blocked Flows' / ; 
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 LOOP(s(i)$(E.L(i)>eps), 
   PUT i.tl:10, '  ', E.L(i) / ; 
 ); 
 PUT / / ; 
 
 lb_DAD = Z.L ; 
 ub_DAD = +inf ; 
 r_iter = 0; 
 SUBNET_DUALILP.optcr = epsilon_AD; 
 
 rbest(i) = no; 
 xbest(iprime) = no; 
 xbard(iprime,d) = no; 
 
 SCALAR 
   num_repeats 
 ; 
 
 put 'DAD   lb=',lb_DAD:12:6 / ; 
 {while DAD relative gap > epsilon and r_iter < max_r_iters} 
 while(ub_DAD - lb_DAD > epsilon_DAD*lb_DAD, 
  while(r_iter < max_r_iters, 
    {solve AD: two ways to do this, either dualILP or Benders. This is 
dualILP.} 
    {set initial solution xbar} 
    solve SUBNET_DUALILP using MIP maximizing Z; 
    {if AD solution lower than DAD upper bound} 
    if(SUBNET_DUALILP.objest < ub_DAD, 
      {update DAD UB} 
      ub_DAD = SUBNET_DUALILP.objest ; 
      put 'DAD * ub=',ub_DAD:12:6 / ; 
      {update incumbent defense} 
      rbest(i) = no; 
      loop(rbar(i), 
        rbest(i) = yes ; 
      ); 
      {record attack corresponding to incumbent defense} 
      xbest(iprime) = no; 
      LOOP(iprime$(X.L(iprime)>0.5), 
        xbest(iprime) = yes; 
      ); 
    ); 
    if(r_iter>1, 
      {check for repeated attack plan} 
      num_repeats = 0; 
      loop(d$(ord(d)<=r_iter), 
        if( (SUM(xbard(iprime,d), X.L(iprime)) >= max_attacks), 
          num_repeats = num_repeats + 1; 
        ); 
      ); 
      if(num_repeats >= 1, 
        put ' repeat attack found, re-solving for unique attack' / ; 
        solve SUBNET_DUALILP_UNIQUE using MIP maximizing Z; 
      ); 
    ); 
    {Solve DAD Master for next r_iter} 
    r_iter = r_iter + 1; 
    PUT 'r_iter: ',r_iter:4:0 / ; 
    loop(d$(ord(d)=r_iter), 
      loop(iprime$(X.L(iprime)>0.5), 
        put '    atk: ', iprime.tl:5 / ; 
        xbard(iprime,d) = yes; 
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      ); 
    ); 
    solve SUBNET_DAD_MASTER using MIP minimizing Z; 
    {if master solution > LB} 
    if(SUBNET_DAD_MASTER.objest > lb_DAD, 
      {update LB} 
      lb_DAD = SUBNET_DAD_MASTER.objest; 
      put 'DAD   lb=',lb_DAD:12:6 / ; 
    ); 
    {update design Rbar = R.L} 
    rbar(i) = no; 
    loop(i$(R.L(i)>0.5), 
      put '    def: ', i.tl:5 / ; 
      rbar(i) = yes; 
    ); 
  ); 
 ); 
 
 rbar(i) = no; 
 LOOP(rbest(i), 





   xbar(iprime) = yes; 
 ); 
 
 SOLVE SUBNET_OPERATOR USING MIP MINIMIZING Z; 
 
PUT SUM(i,R.L(i)):6:0,' Total Repeaters' / ; 
PUT 'Optimal Repeater Locations' / ; 
 PUT 'Site      Row      Column' / ; 
 LOOP(rbar(i), 
   PUT i.tl:7, (CEIL(ORD(i)/15)):8:0, (MOD(ORD(i)-1,15)+1):8:0 / ; 
 ); 
 PUT / ; 
 LOOP(i, 
   if(xbar(i), 
     if(rbar(i), 
       PUT 'Y '; 
     else 
       put 'X '; 
     ); 
   else 
     IF(rbar(i), 
       If(s(i), 
         PUT 'S ' ; 
       ); 
       IF(t(i), 
         PUT 'T ' ; 
       ); 
       IF(not t(i) and not s(i), 
         PUT 'R ' ; 
       ); 
     else 
       PUT '. '; 
     ); 
   ); 
   if(MOD(ORD(i),15)=0, 
     PUT / ; 
   ); 
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 ); 
 PUT / / ; 
 
 PUT 'Attacks' / ; 
 LOOP(xbar(iprime), 
   PUT iprime.tl:10, (CEIL(ORD(iprime)/15)):5:0, (MOD(ORD(iprime)-1,15)+1):5:0 
/ ; 
 ); 
 PUT / / ; 
 
 PUT 'Arc Flows' / ; 
 LOOP(arc(i,j)$(SUM(s(k),Y.L(i,j,k))>eps), 
   PUT i.tl:10, '  ', j.tl:10, '  ', (SUM(s(k),Y.L(i,j,k))):5:2 / ; 
 ); 
 PUT / / ; 
 
 PUT 'Blocked Flows' / ; 
 LOOP(s(i)$(E.L(i)>eps), 
   PUT i.tl:10, '  ', E.L(i) / ; 
 ); 
 
 PUTCLOSE out; 
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APPENDIX B.  RESULTING GAMS OUTPUT FILE FOR 
NETWORK CONFIGURATION A WITH TWO ATTACKS  
10 Total Repeaters 
Initial Repeater Locations 
Site      Row       Column 
n015          1      15 
n016          2       1 
n021          2       6 
n026          2      11 
n113          8       8 
n176         12      11 
n211         15       1 
n216         15       6 
n220         15      10 
n225         15      15 
 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . T 
S . . . . R . . . . R . . . . 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
. . . . . . . S . . . . . . . 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
. . . . . . . . . . R . . . . 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
S . . . . R . . . R . . . . T 
 
Arc Flows 
n016        n021         1.00 
n021        n026         1.00 
n026        n015         1.00 
n113        n176         1.00 
n176        n225         1.00 
n211        n216         1.00 
n216        n220         1.00 





DAD   lb=    8.000000 




r_iter:    1 
    atk: n160 
    atk: n200 
DAD   lb=    9.000000 
    def: n010 
    def: n015 
    def: n016 
    def: n021 
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    def: n056 
    def: n113 
    def: n170 
    def: n211 
    def: n225 
 
r_iter:    2 
    atk: n005 
    atk: n040 
DAD   lb=   10.000000 
    def: n015 
    def: n016 
    def: n072 
    def: n079 
    def: n113 
    def: n154 
    def: n211 
    def: n215 
    def: n220 
    def: n225 
 
r_iter:    3 
    atk: n056 
    atk: n204 
    def: n015 
    def: n016 
    def: n065 
    def: n113 
    def: n154 
    def: n162 
    def: n211 
    def: n216 
    def: n221 
    def: n225 
 
r_iter:    4 
    atk: n146 
    atk: n205 
    def: n005 
    def: n010 
    def: n015 
    def: n016 
    def: n056 
    def: n064 
    def: n113 
    def: n162 
    def: n170 
    def: n211 
    def: n225 
DAD * ub=   13.000000 
 
r_iter:    5 
    atk: n040 
    atk: n146 
    def: n015 
    def: n016 
    def: n072 
    def: n079 
    def: n113 
    def: n154 
    def: n162 
    def: n211 
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    def: n216 
    def: n221 
    def: n225 
DAD * ub=   12.000000 
 
r_iter:    6 
    atk: n056 
    atk: n146 
    def: n015 
    def: n016 
    def: n050 
    def: n072 
    def: n113 
    def: n154 
    def: n176 
    def: n211 
    def: n225 
 
r_iter:    7 
    atk: n058 
    atk: n162 
    def: n010 
    def: n015 
    def: n016 
    def: n056 
    def: n079 
    def: n113 
    def: n154 
    def: n162 
    def: n176 
    def: n211 
    def: n225 
 
r_iter:    8 
    atk: n040 
    atk: n161 
    def: n005 
    def: n015 
    def: n016 
    def: n056 
    def: n064 
    def: n072 
    def: n113 
    def: n170 
    def: n176 
    def: n211 
    def: n225 
 
r_iter:    9 
    atk: n056 
    atk: n160 
    def: n015 
    def: n016 
    def: n050 
    def: n056 
    def: n072 
    def: n113 
    def: n162 
    def: n170 
    def: n176 
    def: n211 
    def: n225 
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r_iter:   10 
    atk: n056 
    atk: n161 
DAD   lb=   11.000000 
    def: n015 
    def: n016 
    def: n065 
    def: n069 
    def: n113 
    def: n128 
    def: n170 
    def: n176 
    def: n191 
    def: n211 
    def: n225 
 
r_iter:   11 
    atk: n160 
    atk: n205 
    def: n015 
    def: n016 
    def: n021 
    def: n065 
    def: n072 
    def: n113 
    def: n128 
    def: n170 
    def: n191 
    def: n211 
    def: n225 
 
r_iter:   12 
    atk: n056 
    atk: n175 
    def: n010 
    def: n015 
    def: n016 
    def: n051 
    def: n079 
    def: n113 
    def: n154 
    def: n211 
    def: n217 
    def: n222 
    def: n225 
 
r_iter:   13 
    atk: n009 
    atk: n208 
    def: n015 
    def: n016 
    def: n035 
    def: n079 
    def: n113 
    def: n128 
    def: n170 
    def: n177 
    def: n191 
    def: n211 
    def: n225 
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r_iter:   14 
    atk: n019 
    atk: n142 
    def: n015 
    def: n016 
    def: n072 
    def: n079 
    def: n113 
    def: n128 
    def: n162 
    def: n170 
    def: n191 
    def: n211 
    def: n225 
 
r_iter:   15 
    atk: n056 
    atk: n176 
    def: n015 
    def: n016 
    def: n056 
    def: n065 
    def: n113 
    def: n114 
    def: n129 
    def: n163 
    def: n170 
    def: n211 
    def: n225 
 
r_iter:   16 
    atk: n040 
    atk: n147 
DAD   lb=   11.142857 
    def: n010 
    def: n015 
    def: n016 
    def: n050 
    def: n056 
    def: n067 
    def: n113 
    def: n170 
    def: n211 
    def: n220 
    def: n225 
 
r_iter:   17 
    atk: n009 
    atk: n040 
    def: n005 
    def: n010 
    def: n015 
    def: n016 
    def: n065 
    def: n069 
    def: n113 
    def: n162 
    def: n170 
    def: n211 
    def: n225 
 
r_iter:   18 
 86 
    atk: n010 
    atk: n146 
    def: n015 
    def: n016 
    def: n021 
    def: n050 
    def: n056 
    def: n113 
    def: n154 
    def: n172 
    def: n211 
    def: n221 
    def: n225 
 
r_iter:   19 
    atk: n040 
    atk: n205 
    def: n015 
    def: n016 
    def: n021 
    def: n026 
    def: n054 
    def: n07 
    def: n079 
    def: n113 
    def: n154 
    def: n211 
    def: n225 
 
r_iter:   20 
    atk: n040 
    atk: n056 
    def: n015 
    def: n016 
    def: n056 
    def: n064 
    def: n113 
    def: n154 
    def: n159 
    def: n162 
    def: n193 
    def: n211 
    def: n225 
 
r_iter:   21 
    atk: n040 
    atk: n177 
    def: n015 
    def: n016 
    def: n072 
    def: n079 
    def: n113 
    def: n154 
    def: n158 
    def: n207 
    def: n211 
    def: n215 
    def: n225 
 
r_iter:   22 
    atk: n056 
    atk: n191 
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    def: n015 
    def: n016 
    def: n021 
    def: n050 
    def: n056 
    def: n113 
    def: n154 
    def: n173 
    def: n211 
    def: n222 
    def: n225 
 
r_iter:   23 
    atk: n040 
    atk: n206 
    def: n005 
    def: n015 
    def: n016 
    def: n027 
    def: n053 
    def: n064 
    def: n072 
    def: n113 
    def: n170 
    def: n211 
    def: n225 
 
r_iter:   24 
    atk: n011 
    atk: n071 
    def: n010 
    def: n015 
    def: n016 
    def: n065 
    def: n113 
    def: n162 
    def: n170 
    def: n174 
    def: n179 
    def: n211 
    def: n225 
 
r_iter:   25 
    atk: n146 
    atk: n180 
    def: n015 
    def: n016 
    def: n050 
    def: n072 
    def: n113 
    def: n154 
    def: n159 
    def: n162 
    def: n164 
    def: n211 
    def: n225 
 
r_iter:   26 
    atk: n058 
    atk: n148 
    def: n015 
    def: n016 
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    def: n056 
    def: n064 
    def: n113 
    def: n154 
    def: n159 
    def: n162 
    def: n207 
    def: n211 
    def: n225 
 
r_iter:   27 
    atk: n063 
    atk: n138 
    def: n012 
    def: n015 
    def: n016 
    def: n065 
    def: n113 
    def: n162 
    def: n170 
    def: n174 
    def: n211 
    def: n223 
    def: n225 
 
r_iter:   28 
    atk: n146 
    atk: n173 
    def: n010 
    def: n015 
    def: n016 
    def: n056 
    def: n065 
    def: n069 
    def: n113 
    def: n162 
    def: n170 
    def: n211 
    def: n225 
 
r_iter:   29 
    atk: n055 
    atk: n146 
    def: n015 
    def: n016 
    def: n050 
    def: n072 
    def: n113 
    def: n162 
    def: n170 
    def: n174 
    def: n211 
    def: n220 
    def: n225 
 
r_iter:   30 
    atk: n034 
    atk: n154 
    def: n015 
    def: n016 
    def: n028 
    def: n065 
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    def: n069 
    def: n072 
    def: n113 
    def: n211 
    def: n216 
    def: n221 
    def: n225 
 
11 Total Repeaters 
Optimal Repeater Locations 
Site      Row      Column 
n015          1      15 
n016          2       1 
n072          5      12 
n079          6       4 
n113          8       8 
n154         11       4 
n162         11      12 
n211         15       1 
n216         15       6 
n221         15      11 
n225         15      15 
 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . T 
S . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
. . . . . . . . . . X . . . . 
. . . . . . . . . . . R . . . 
. . . R . . . . . . . . . . . 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
. . . . . . . S . . . . . . . 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
. . . . . . . . . . X . . . . 
. . . R . . . . . . . R . . . 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
S . . . . R . . . . R . . . T 
 
Attacks 
n056          4   11 
n146         10   11 
 
Arc Flows 
n016        n079         1.00 
n079        n154         1.00 
n113        n154         1.00 
n154        n216         2.00 
n211        n216         1.00 
n216        n221         3.00 
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